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Abstract   
Web servers and web-based applications are commonly used as attack targets. The main issues are how to prevent 
unauthorised access and to protect web servers from the attack. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are widely used 
security tools to detect cyber-attacks and malicious activities in computer systems and networks. In this paper, we focus 
on the detection of various web-based attacks using Geometrical Structure Anomaly Detection (GSAD) model and we 
also propose a novel algorithm for the selection of most discriminating features to improve the computational complexity 
of payload-based GSAD model. Linear Discriminant method (LDA) is used for the feature reduction and classification of 
the incoming network traffic. GSAD model is based on a pattern recognition technique used in image processing. It 
analyses the correlations between various payload features and uses Mahalanobis Distance Map (MDM) to calculate the 
difference between normal and abnormal network traffic. We focus on the detection of generic attacks, shell code attacks, 
polymorphic attacks and polymorphic blending attacks. We evaluate accuracy of GSAD model experimentally on the 
real-world attacks dataset created at Georgia Institute of Technology. We conducted preliminary experiments on the 
DARPA 99 dataset to evaluate the accuracy of feature reduction.   
 
Keywords 
Internet security, Intrusion detection, Anomaly detection, Feature selection, Linear discriminant analysis  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The universal use of the Internet has made it more difficult to achieve a high security level, and attackers target more 
often on web applications. Cyber-attacks and breaches of information security appear to be increasing in frequency and 
impact (Internet Storm Center, 2009; Perdisci et al., 2009; Packet Storm, 2006).   
 
Web servers and web-based applications are popular attack targets because tools used for creating web applications are 
easy to use, and many people writing and deploying them have little background in security. Web servers and web-based 
applications are vulnerable to attack because of improper and poor security policy and methodology. Hence securing 
Network server system is an important and difficult task.  
 
The commonly used IDSs are: signature based intrusion detection systems and anomaly based intrusion detection 
systems. Signature based IDS(s), are based on pattern matching techniques. An alert is raised when a match of attack 
signature is found. Unfortunately, signature based IDS is unable to detect novel attack (i.e., zero-day) or polymorphic 
attacks, until the signature database is updated. Due to the ad hoc and dynamic nature of web traffic, it is difficult to keep 
intrusion detection signature sets updated regularly. The diversity of the cyber-attacks makes signature-based IDSs less 
suitable for protecting a web-based service.   
 
On the other hand, an anomaly-based intrusion detection system builds a statistical model of the normal behaviour of the 
monitored system/network. Any deviation of the incoming event profile with respect to the normal profile is considered 
as anomaly and raises an alarm. Anomaly based IDS can detect new attacks and variances of attacks. Since they do not 
require any prior knowledge of the application or system, an anomaly based system can protect custom-developed 
applications, e.g. web applications. However, an anomaly based system has a relatively high number of false positives. It 
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is a difficult and challenging task for anomaly based detector to characterise normal behaviour because web traffic is 
highly variable.   
 
Statistical techniques are proposed to solve the anomaly detection problem for web servers.  Tandon and Chan (2005) 
proposed a model based on system calls' arguments along with the sequences of system calls.  Lio and Vemuri (2002) 
proposed a model based on text categorisation, and used a 'bag of system calls' representation. Unfortunately system call 
monitoring was not a suitable solution for web servers because of the mis-configuration of web server or errors in the 
web application code. 
 
Recent works in anomaly detection based on packet payload can be found in (Kruegel, Vigna & Robertson, 2005; 
Mahoney & Chan, 2003; Tombini et al., 2005; Wang & Stolfo, 2004). The drawbacks of these IDSs are relatively high 
false positive rates. It is more difficult to construct an accurate model because of the curse of dimensionality and 
computational complexity. In (Estevez-Tapiador et al., 2004), Estevez-Tapiador et al. proposed a theoretical framework 
for intrusion detection at application layer. A model for specific service requests was developed using short sequences of 
adjoining bytes in the payload. Similarity between the payloads was evaluated using distance between the two points in 
the payload in Hilbert space. It has low detection rates and high false alarm rate for small sequences of characters of 
length k. This approach has high computational complexity and does not define the criteria of the selection of sequences 
of characters. All these approaches for anomaly detection ignored the correlation between the features of the payload.  
 
Various feature reduction techniques used to reduce the header features of the packets are discussed in (YANG & QI, 
2008; Shih et al. 2008; Singh & Silakari, 2009; Chen et al, 2006). Not much research is conducted on the packet payload 
feature reduction. The early feature reduction approaches on payload are given in (Nwanze & Summerville, 2008). 
 
We have conducted a study of HTTP traffic for intrusion detection in (Jamdagini et al., 2010) on DARPA 1999 IDS 
dataset. The results obtained are very encouraging. In this paper, we will further evaluate the accuracy of GSAD model 
on GATECH attack dataset (Perdisci et al., 2009), which is a real attack dataset. Some of these attacks are generated 
from DARPA 1999 attack dataset. Interesting results are obtained and demonstrated through experiments.  We further 
discuss the means of automatically updating the model to maintain an accurate view of normal payloads seen most 
recently. We update the mean and standard deviation as mentioned in (Knuth, 1973). 
 
Current anomaly Intrusion Detection Systems are not efficient for real time intrusion detection due to high computational 
complexity. In this paper we further propose a novel algorithm for the selection of most discriminating features to 
improve the computational complexity of GSAD model. This not only reduces the computational complexity but also 
reduces the testing time of the classifier. Linear Discriminant method (LDA) is used for the feature reduction and 
classification of the incoming network traffic. This will reduce the high dimensional MDM feature space (2562) in to a 
very low dimensional feature space with high efficiency and low use of system resources.    
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section II presents brief description of GSAD model in HTTP environment and 
datasets used for the experiments, as well as the experimental results. In Section III we analyse our results obtained from 
the experiments. In Section IV, we discuss the feature reduction module (FRM) and algorithm used for the selection of 
most discriminating features and discusses results obtained from the preliminary testing. Finally, Section V draws 
conclusions and future works.   
GSAD MODEL, DATASET AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Brief Description of GSAD Model 
 
The description of GSAD model in HTTP environment is given in (Jamdagini et al., 2010). In this section, we give  a 
brief description of GSAD model in HTTP environment.   
 
The key components of GSAD model are a 1-byte feature model and a GSM. In the GSAD each feature represents the 
occurrence frequency of one of the 256 ASCII characters in the payload. A model of normal HTTP traffic is then 
constructed by computing the MDM of each packet payload. Weight factor is used to recognize intrusive action. The 
model uses a pattern recognition technique (Chen et al., 2007) to calculate the correlations between various payload 
features. This facilitates the anomaly detection ability of an IDS system without the prior knowledge of network attacks. 
An alarm is generated if the weight factor score is greater than the predetermined threshold value. 
 
The payload obtained from HTTP GET request is represented by a pattern vector X in a 256–dimensional feature space. 
The average value of features, μ, and the covariance value of each feature, ∑i, in the 1- byte payload model for ‘HTTP 
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request’ traffic , and Mahalanobis distance, ݀ሺ௜ǡ௝ሻ are calculated using (2),  (3) and (4) in (Jamdagini et al., 2010) 
Mahalanobis Distance Map D of a ‘HTTP request’ network packet is constructed as follow, 
 
ܦ ൌ
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ۍ
݀ሺ଴ǡ଴ሻ ݀ሺ଴ǡଵሻ ڮ ݀ሺ଴ǡଶହହሻ
݀ሺଵǡ଴ሻ
ڭ
݀ሺଵǡଵሻ ǥ
ڭڰ
 ڭ
݀ሺଶହହǡ଴ሻ ݀ሺଶହହǡଵሻ ڮ ݀ሺଶହହǡଶହହሻے
ۑ
ۑ
ې

 
The MDM investigate the geometrical relationship of the correlations among the payload features. We create a statistical 
model of the normal profile of ‘HTTP request’ by considering the distance maps of m normal packets, (denoted by ܦଵ௡௢௥ , 
… , ܦ௠௡௢௥). The averages and variances for all elements (i, j) of the distance maps are computed by the (5) and (6) in 
(Jamdagini et al., 2010). Here (0 ≤ i, j ≤ 255), and ݀௡௢௥ሺ௜ǡ௝ሻǡ௞ is the (i, j) element of distance maps ܦ௞௡௢௥ . The ҧ݀௡௢௥ሺ௜ǡ௝ሻ and 
ߪ௡௢௥ሺ௜ǡ௝ሻଶ  are all kept in a model Mnor for further evaluation. 
 
In the recognition phase, new incoming network packet is processed using procedures (1) – (6) in (Jamdagini et al., 2010) 
to construct its Mahalanobis Distance Map (Dobj ).  
 
ܦ௢௕௝ ൌ ൣ݀௜ǡ௝
௢௕௝൧
ଶହ଺ൈଶହ଺
 
 
Then, similarity calculation (Weight factor w) is calculated to estimate the Mahalanobis distance between incoming 
‘HTTP request’ map Dobj and the generated normal HTTP traffic map using equation (7) in (Jamdagini et al., 2010). If the 
Weight factor w is beyond the thresholds the incoming packet is considered as an intrusion.  
 
We reviewed the GSAD model by updating the 1-byte distribution and MDMs for new observed normal samples. This is 
achieved by updating mean and standard deviation of each ASCII character seen for each new sample observed in the 
packet payload. We generated mean and standard deviation for 256 ASCII characters array for n payloads in the model. 
This is implemented as an incremental learning model. 
 
Dataset and Experimental Results 
 
In this section, we present the experiments conducted in HTTP environment using GSAD model to detect various web-
based attacks. The DARPA 1999 training dataset (Lippmann et al., 2000; Fielding et al., 1999) is used for constructing 
normal profile of HTTP traffic. For attack traffic, GATECH attack dataset (Perdisci et al., 2009) is used since this is real 
attack dataset. And some of the attacks are similar to DARPA 1999 dataset.  
 
We implement the GSAD model using Matlab 2009b. Experiments are conducted to determine an appropriate value of 
threshold. We consider in our experiments (lower and higher) threshold range from -3 standard deviation of Weight 
factor to +3 standard deviation of Weight factor for achieving optimal detection rates and low false positive alarm rates.  
 
Experimental Results 
 
We conducted experiments using our GSAD model on training (normal) dataset and test (attack) dataset. Brief 
descriptions of the datasets are given in the training and testing sections below. In the first part of our experiments, we 
present the model generation for normal HTTP traffic. Afterwards, we evaluate the accuracy of our GSAD model in 
detecting various attacks, namely generic attacks, shell code attacks, polymorphic attacks and polymorphic blending 
attack coming through HTTP services.  
 
TRAINING OF GSAD MODEL ON DARPA 1999 IDS DATASET 
 
a.  
Training dataset (DARPA 1999 IDS dataset): Although DARPA 1999 database is not without criticism (McHugh, 2000) 
but this is the only standard dataset available publically.  We extract inbound ‘HTTP request’ packets from DARPA 1999 
(Lippmann et al., 2000), week 1 (5 days) and week 3 (5 days) labelled as attack free for the training of GSAD model. The 
total numbers of packets used for training of the model after filtering are 13,933 and 10,464 for hosts marx and hume 
respectively ((Lippmann et al., 2000). 
 
b. Model Training: HTTP is an application-layer protocol which provides a distributed, and collaborative hypermedia 
information systems service. The communication between the HTTP-client and HTTP-server uses a Request/Response 
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standard (Ingham & Inoue, 2007). In the experiments, we train the GSAD model on the training dataset and generate a 
normal profile for the HTTP GET request. For normal profile, we first generate a character’s relative frequency model, 
and then develop an average geometrical structure model using equations (1) to (4) in (Jamdagini et al., 2010) for hosts 
marx and hume respectively. Due to the limitation of space, the results are shown for one host only, and the similar 
behaviour is obtained for the other host. 
 
Figure 1 (a) shows the character’s relative frequency model and (b) shows the MDM pattern of normal HTTP traffic 
behaviour for host marx. In Figure 1 (b), the X axis and Y axis show the 256 possible features (ASCII characters) present 
in a packet payload. The cross point on the figure represents correlation between two features. Although from the MDM 
patterns (GSAD model) we can distinguish and infer visually the suspected incoming packet from the normal network 
traffic, but because of link speed and large amount of everyday network traffic, this is not an efficient solution for 
network intrusion detection. This also easily overloads the capacity of a network administrator. To overcome this 
problem, Weight factor (w) and threshold values are used to distinguish malicious behaviours from the normal 
behaviours. According to our experiments, the (higher and lower) threshold values for host marx are [1.9187e04, 
6.6759e03] respectively.  
 
TESTING OF GSAD MODEL ON GATECH ATTACK DATASET 
Test dataset (GATECH attack dataset) 
 
For our experiments, we focus on the attacks coming through HTTP service only. HTTP-based attacks are mainly from 
the HTTP GET/POST request at the server side. GATECH attack dataset is publicly available (Perdisci et al., 2009; 
Cooke, 2002). This is a labelled dataset and has several non-polymorphic HTTP attacks provided by Ingham and Inoue 
(Cooke, 2002) and several polymorphic HTTP attacks generated by Perdisci et al. (2009) using both the polymorphic 
engine CLET and a Polymorphic Blending Attack engine. The attacks are divided into four groups, namely Generic 
attacks, Shell-code attacks, CLET attacks and Polymorphic Blending attacks (PBAs). All HTTP request attack packets 
are used in our experimentation. 
 
  
 
(a) Character relative frequency of normal GET traffic     (b) Mahalanobis Distance Map of normal GET traffic 
  
Figure 1.  Character Relative Frequency and Mahalanobis Distance Map of Normal GET Traffic for Host marx 
 
Model Testing   
 
In our definition of attack detection, an attack is detected as long as one of its attack packets is identified as abnormal. 
We conduct experiments on testing dataset and evaluate similarity between the MDM pattern of new incoming packet 
profile with the MDM pattern of normal profile using a Weight factor (w) and a threshold value. The incoming request is 
considered as an attack or a threat if the Weight factor is more than +3δ or less than -3δ. Results are ‘very encouraging’ 
and almost all the attack instances are detected successfully with no false negative. Due to the limitation of space, only 
the results of some of the attacks are discussed here.  
  
a. Generic attacks: This dataset consists of 67 HTTP attacks. The attacks cause Information Leakage and Denial of 
Service (DoS). Our model could detect around 90% of these attacks. Figs. 2(a), (b) and (c) show MDM results for some 
Generic attacks.  
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        (a) Information leakage attack          (b) Input validation error attack         (c) Signed interpretation of                         
                                                                                                                                         unsigned value  
 
Figure 2.  Mahalanobis Distance Map of Generic attacks 
 
b. Shell-code Attacks: Shell-code attacks are particularly very harmful as they inject executable code and hijack the 
normal execution of the target application. This dataset contains 11 shell-code attacks from the Generic Attack dataset. 
Some famous worms, such as Code-Red Worm, use shell code attacks to propagate. Figs. 3(a) and (b) show MDM results 
for the behaviours of Code-Red worm attack and Get Buffer Over-flow attack. 
 
           
            
      (a)  Code-Red worm attack                    (b) Get Buffer Over-flow attack 
 
Figure 3.  Mahalanobis Distance Map of Shell-code attacks 
 
c. CLET Attacks: These attacks are generated from 8 shell-code attacks using polymorphic engine CLET. Polymorphic 
version of each attack uses the payload statistics computed on each distinct day of traffic from DARPA and GATECH 
datasets for training CLET polymorphic engine. Overall, 96 polymorphic attacks are present in the dataset. Figure 4 shows 
MDM results for the behaviour of padded attack (polymorphic attack) CLET attack. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Mahalanobis Distance Map of padded attack (polymorphic attack) 
 
d. Polymorphic Blending attacks (PBA): This dataset is generated using three attacks, namely Code-Red, DDK and an 
attack against Windows Media Service. These attacks exploit the different vulnerabilities in the Windows systems. Five 
different hosts are selected randomly from GATECH dataset to create PBAs for the three attacks. Figure 5 shows MDM 
result for the behaviour of Window Media Service attack (polymorphic blending attack). 
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Figure 5.  Mahalanobis Distance Map of Window Media Service attack (polymorphic blending attack) 
 
The testing results for various attacks are shown in Figure 2–Figure 5. The figures show clear differences between the 
behaviour of the various attack profiles and the normal HTTP request profile. Furthermore, the correlations between the 
features in these attacks are different from the correlations between the features of normal HTTP requests on the hosts 
marx and hume. Again, the X axis and Y axis show the 256 possible features (ASCII characters) present in a packet 
payload. The cross points in the figure represents the correlation between two features.  
 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
The GSAD model is evaluated in terms of its detection rate and false negative rates and its ability to classify the attacked 
‘HTTP request’ packets correctly. The results in Section II show that the Geometrical Structure Anomaly Detector 
(Mahalanobis Distance Map) can detect new attacks including polymorphic attack and PBAs without prior knowledge of 
the attacks with high accuracy.  
 
Selection of threshold value is very important for the evaluation of IDS as this directly impacts the performance of the 
IDS. Standard deviation of Weight factor w of the observed samples is used to determine the threshold value. We assume 
that the distribution is normal, three standard deviations of Weight factor accounts for 99% of the sample population. 
Therefore, we set the threshold values to be -3δ and +3δ in our experiments for achieving optimal detection rates and low 
false positive alarm rates.  The results tested on all attack groups except the generic attack group show constant 
performance for various sets of threshold values. GSAD has a very low false positive rate for DARPA 1999 dataset 
compared with other IDS systems as shown in Table I. 
 
The computational complexity is based on 1-byte Mahalanobis distance map calculations (2562). Taking computational 
complexity and heavy network traffic into consideration, this limits the application of the model in real-time 
environment. To improve the complexity of GSAD model, we need to reduce the dimensionality of MDM matrix from 
2562 to low dimension matrix. To our knowledge, many other anomaly models are also complex and inefficient.  
 
The results of comparison of various models are shown in Table 1.  Table 1 shows the comparison of GSAD, McPAD 
and PAYL models on GATECH attack datasets. In comparison to PAYL and McPAD, our model could achieve 100% 
detection rate. 
  
Table 1.   Detection Rate of GSAD, McPAD and PAYL on GATECH Attack Datasets 
 
 
Algorithm Detection Rate 
 
False Positive  Rates 
 
Generic 
attack 
Shell code 
attack CLET attack 
GSAD 90% 100% 100% 0.087% On DRAPA 1999 dataset 
McPAD 75% 96% 99% 1% 
PAYL 90% 99% 95% 1% 
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FEATURE REDUCATION MODULE 
 
Current anomaly Intrusion Detection Systems are not efficient for real time intrusion detection due to high computational 
complexity. In this section we further propose a novel approach for the selection of most discriminating features to 
improve the computational complexity of GSAD model. Linear Discriminant method (LDA) (Cooke, 2002) is used for 
the feature reduction and classification of the incoming network traffic. Using LDA, an optimal projection matrix can be 
found to transform higher dimensional feature domain to a lower dimensional space and to preserve most of the 
signification information for data classification. LDA is used to select significant features from Mahalanobis Distance 
Map (MDM), which is generated by Geometrical Structure Model (GSM) for each single network packet.  
 
FEATURE SELECTION 
 
To select the most discriminating features, we first prepare a large number of normal and attack sample packets, and 
calculate MDMs using the equations in ((Jamdagini et al., 2010)) for all of the samples. The Mahalanobis distance map is 
denoted by  ൌ ൣሺ୧ǡ୨ሻ൧ଶହ଺ൈଶହ଺. D1
normal, …, Dmnormal and D1attack, …, Dmattack indicate the MDMs for the normal and the 
attack packets respectively. 
 
Next, we calculate the difference at element (i, j) between normal and attack sample packets using equations (6) in [20] 
and equation (1).  
 
 ܦ݂݅ ሺ݂௜ǡ௝ሻ ൌ 
ሺௗതሺ೔ǡೕሻ
೙೚ೝ೘ೌ೗ିௗതሺ೔ǡೕሻ
ೌ೟೟ೌ೎ೖሻమ
ఙ೙೚ೝ೘ೌ೗ሺ೔ǡೕሻ
మ ାఙೌ೟೟ೌ೎ೖሺ೔ǡೕሻ
మ ሺ݅ǡ ݆ א ሾͲǡ ʹͷͷሿሻ   (1) 
 
The average MDMs of normal HTTP and Phf attack sample packets are shown in Figure 6, and the difference map is 
shown in Figure 7. There are totally 256 × 256 features in the average MDMs and the difference map. 
 
As can be seen from the above figures, those normal and attack packets present clearly different behaviours. However, if 
the whole difference map is directly involved into each differentiation, it will cause heavy workload for real-time 
intrusion detection. Thus, a feature selection approach is designed to avoid this problem. The process of the approach is 
shown in Figure 8. In the difference map, we consider a feature with the larger value as a more important feature in 
discriminating normal and attack packets. So, the r largest features are selected from the difference map initially. These 
features are constructed an r dimensional distance value vector denoted as Dr,k = [dk(Ur,1 ,Vr,1), dk(Ur,2 ,Vr,2), …, dk(Ur,r ,Vr,r)]T, 
where (Ur,1, Vr,1), (Ur,2, Vr,2), …, (Ur,r, Vr,r) indicate the positions of the r largest features in the difference map and r is 
range from 1 to  256 × 256, and k indicates the k-th sample. 
 
According to the selected Dr, a projection matrix Ar is computed using equation (2). 
 
 ܣ௥ ൌ ሺσܦഥ௥௡௢௥௠௔௟ ൅ σܦഥ௥௔௧௧௔௖௞ሻିଵሺܦഥ௥௡௢௥௠௔௟ െ ܦഥ௥௔௧௧௔௖௞ሻ        (2) 
 
 
 
Figure 7.     Difference Map Between Normal 
HTTP and Phf Attack Packets 
 
 
Figure 6.    Average Mahalanobis Distance 
Maps of Phf Attack Packets  
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where ܦഥ௥௡௢௥௠௔௟ andܦഥ௥௔௧௧௔௖௞  are the averages of ܦ௥ǡ௞௡௢௥௠௔௟  andܦ௥ǡ௞௔௧௧௔௖௞, and σܦഥ௥௡௢௥௠௔௟  and σܦഥ௥௔௧௧௔௖௞are the covariances of 
ܦ௥ǡ௞௡௢௥௠௔௟  andܦ௥ǡ௞௔௧௧௔௖௞. 
 
The whole process will be conducted iteratively until the number of significant features reaches the pre-set value, and the 
projection matrix Ar will be determined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.     Flow Chart for Feature Selection 
 
 
 
RECOGNITION PROCESS 
Similar to the recognition process in (Chen et al., 2007), projection matrix Ar, and the r selected significant features are 
used to calculate the score value for each input network packet. 
 
 ݏܿ݋ݎ݁ ൌ ܣ௥ ൈ ܦ௥
௜௡௣௨௧  (3)  
 
If the score is larger than a pre-calculated threshold, the input network packet will be classified as attack packet. The 
threshold is selected using the LDA optimizing criterion (Cooke, 2002) which finds out the maximum ratio of between-
class difference and within-class difference.  
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We evaluated the LDA feature selection approach on the DARPA 1999 IDS dataset (Lippmann et al., 2000). In the 
experiments, we considered inbound HTTP traffic only. 2600 normal HTTP request packets and 2600 Phf attack packets 
are used in the evaluation. The experimental results are shown in Table 2. 
 
No 
Ye
BEGIN
Select r most significant features and their 
positions in the difference map 
Check Feature number > 
Pre-set number
Calculate Mean and covariance for distribution 
of normal packet and attack packet according to 
the positions of the significant features 
Calculate projection matrix Ar 
Discard the n smallest features in the Ar 
projection matrix and keep the positions of the 
remaining significant features 
Obtain the final most significant features and 
their positions in the MDM 
END 
